End Game in Iraq

Wars are often launched with stirring appeals to patriotism and national unity. They are begun with the hope of writing wrongs or eliminating threats. They are time and again seen as a quick and decisive means of resolving a frustrating problem. That they so often fail to fulfill any of these expectations seems to cause little reflection among those who favor recourse to violent force. It has been said that belief in the quick and decisive war is one of humanity's most persistent and tragic illusions.

These lessons were underscored again this week as we take stock of the latest comments by the Iraqi Foreign Minister and digest their meaning for the American adventure in the Land of the Two Rivers.

As if to place additional emphasis on remarks made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki last month, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari made clear that negotiations with the United States could only reach agreement if "definitely there has to be a very clear timeline" for American withdrawal. This again contradicts President Bush's hope for a "general time horizon" or an "aspirational" vague time frame. Zebari further commented that the two sides were "very close" to finishing an agreement to replace the U.N. mandate that expires at the end of this year.

According to "two senior Iraqi officials" U.S. forces would withdraw from Iraq's cities by June 30, 2009. All combat troops would be out of the country by October, 2010. Remaining support personnel would leave by the end of 2013. The Iraqi government made clear that specific dates are necessary for any agreement to secure passage in the country's Parliament.

In terms of the expectations generated in the run up to the war, there are some rather blatant inaccuracies. Congress and the American people were assured a real military threat existed. None did. The conflict would last "weeks, not months." If the timeline Zebari spoke of is accurate, we are a little past the halfway point after 5 1/2 years of involvement. The expense would be no more than $20 billion. The official costs on the books have already surpassed $700 billion, and are perhaps double that when indirect costs are included. And we are only halfway through. We are no safer against our real enemies. They continue to train and plot from sanctuaries several hundred miles away.

Though this administration has been more self-deluded and pigheaded than most, these are endemic risks when one goes to war, an inherently risky and unpredictable pursuit. Expectations are rarely borne out. Your opponent generally proves far more resilient than you thought. You usually find you have made a number of incorrect assessments about his resources, capabilities, culture and will. When you are trying to kill people they develop a remarkable capacity to find your weaknesses. Things never proceed as quickly or cheaply as you plan. And the tyrant we deposed would probably have died from natural causes by the year 2013 anyway.

One can hope that this latest example will make America's leaders much more cautious about beating the drums of war from now on and America's people far more skeptical about marching to them. Sadly, that was a lesson also hoped for after the nation's dismal experience in Southeast Asia. In what may be an ironic positive, the architects of the war have at last succeeded in uniting the American people, the majority of whom believe now that the war was a mistake and the sooner we are finished with it the better. It would be good to suppose the lesson will stick this time, but if past is prologue the odds seem less than favorable.