Iraqi Morass Widens

It has been said that the idea of the quick and decisive war is one of the most persistent and tragic illusions of humankind. The morass in Iraq, now in its sixth year, is a case in point.

There exists a nearly inexorable tendency in such cases, as frustrations mount and difficulties deepen, for them also to widen. As the strategic front expands it often seems imperative to protect military "gains" against newly discovered threats from farther afield, thus requiring action against a widening circle of potential malice. The principle is called entropy, the tendency of an expansionist state to conquer A, which puts it on the borders of B and C, and then feel the need to attack B and C to secure its initial prize. This then puts it on the borders of D, E and F, which are then seen as the new threats.

The process leads successively to overextension and the eventual exhaustion of the expanding power. So it was historically with Rome, the Mongols, Spain and Britain, and so it is now with the United States in Iraq.

Admiral Michael Mullen's warnings against Iran fit the pattern. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Iran about meddling in Iraq and threatened military repercussions, saying the U.S. military had evidence Iran has been sending weapons to the Shiite factions there. Mullen spoke of diplomatic and economic pressure, but continued, "When I say I don't take any military options off the table, that certainly more than implies that we have military options. That kind of planning activity has been going on for a long time."

Any thorough planning for the invasion and occupation of Iraq should have considered probable reaction from neighboring Iran. Iran must be vitally concerned with events in Iraq. Iraq invaded Iran in the 1980s and started a war that took an estimated 1 million Iranian lives. It ought to have been considered that an Iraqi government under the control of an avowed enemy of Iran (the United States), could only be viewed with the gravest alarm in Tehran, and that Iran would feel it crucial to appeal to co-religionist Shiites there for its own security.

The recent visit of the Iranian president to Iraq was an initiative toward one of the two main Shiite groupings, just as its protection of refugee cleric Muktada al Sadr and possible assistance to his Mahdi Army is an effort to hedge its bets by cozying up to the other. If these developments were unforeseen by U.S. planners it is testament only to their cavalier overconfidence and profound ignorance of the region. If they were foreseen it follows that an attack on Iran was contemplated from the beginning.

Either way, the ongoing American involvement in Iraq continues to destabilize and inflame the region, push up the price of oil, fan anti-American sentiment, weaken moderate Arab governments and encourage a steady flow of recruits for extremist groups. These are all opposite to the avowed aims and stated expectations of the invasion. A "quick war" has once again turned into quicksand.