Obama's Afghan Conundrum

The complicated situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is yet another major piece of unfinished business the Bush Administration will leave on Barack Obama's doorstep. How he handles it will provide a major insight into the new president's methods and world view.

Obama won the Democratic nomination for one reason more than any other: he opposed the Iraq invasion and war from the start. This was not because he is a pacifist. It is because he correctly assessed that the Al Qaeda group responsible for the 9/11 attacks and their Taliban enablers were in Afghanistan and, following the Bush Administration's botched campaign against them, across the border in Pakistan as well. All through the campaign he spoke of winding down in Iraq and ramping up in Afghanistan.

The situation after after seven years finds the Taliban, driven from power at the end of 2001, resurgent throughout Afghanistan. While in control of most of Afghanistan before 9/11 they ran a rigidly repressive Islamic theocracy and welcomed the presence of radical groups such as Al Qaeda. The Taliban are particularly strong in the nation's South among the majority Pashtun tribal areas. Their leaders, including Mullah Omar, are believed to be ensconced in the Waziristan region of Western Pakistan. From there they train and stage attacks across the border. Pashtuns are numerous on that side of the frontier as well.

Al Qaeda too has reconstituted itself. Though its leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are also though to be in the "tribal autonomous areas" of Western Pakistan, the organization has tentacles in many countries. Terror attacks since 9/11 have originated from such places as Indonesia, North Africa, Yemen, the Philippines and Spain. Their presence is believed to be strong in Somalia, Sudan and Bangladesh, and they are known to have a presence even in European countries and lawless areas of South America. Some entered Iraq following the American invasion there, but their heinous conduct finally wound up turning most of their early Sunni Muslim allies against them.

Now after seven years of general futility the Afghan president grows increasingly frustrated and impatient with the US-led NATO effort in his country. Hamid Karzai and his government exert effective administration over little more than the capital city of Kabul itself. He is openly talking of sitting down to negotiate with the Taliban and asking the international force to leave. See the story here. Warlords of the various ethnic groups such as Uzbeks and Turkmen control swaths of territory, as do the Taliban and the NATO forces. The NATO presence of some 60,000, more than half of them Americans, are far too few to pacify the rugged countryside and its fiercely independent factions. They are increasingly turning to greater opium production to finance their operations.

Pakistan is a nation riven with rival factions itself. The elected President, Asif Ali Zardari (official biography here) of Pakistan certainly has reason to oppose terrorism. He is the widower of Benazir Bhutto who was murdered in a terrorist attack a year ago in Rawalpindi, presumably by fundamentalist groups who could not abide the thought a her, a liberal woman, once again as President of Pakistan. See the Bhutto biography here. Its Inter Services Intelligence agency helped create the Taliban as well as the Lashtar e Taiba terrorist group that attacked Mumbai, India last month.

Why was Pakistan forming such groups? In the case of the Taliban, it was originally to oppose the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Lashtar was formed to resist India's control over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The fact that the groups have gone rogue has not discredited them in all eyes among Pakistan's power structure. While many see them as sources of threat and instability to Pakistan itself (as they are), fundamentalists like their theology and important circles within the military enjoy longstanding ties to them and are seemingly acting to protect them from the sporadic army incursions the government sends into the Western border areas.

Pakistan has developed nuclear arms, as has India. Should Pakistan prove unable to subdue Lashtar-e-Taiba there is good reason to fear an Indian attack on its suspected bases. The dangers of such a confrontation are obvious. Similarly, American air strikes and even commando raids across the border into Pakistan from Afghanistan nettle sensibilities there as well. President Zardari may not have full command of his own government in the matter. He recently promised a sweep but then the military cancelled it.

Obama's challenge is thus extreme. He visited Pakistan as a young man and was impressed with the need to ease the poverty there that helps to fuel violent radicalism. He wants an "ally in the war on terror" there but knows that if he pushes too hard Zardari may be ousted in favor of someone less well disposed to American interests or anti terrorism. He would definitely like to find a way to satisfy India's understandable concerns without destablizing Pakistan further or touching off a nuclear crisis in South Asia.

To settle the Kashimiri dispute on terms favorable to Pakistan (the region is primarily Muslim) in exchange for sincere Pakistani assistance against the terrorist groups might provide the best avenue for achieving productive results. Whether Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton can do this remains to be seen. It is undeniably a very tall order. But otherwise we are likely to see the same threat based in Western Pakistan inviting more American strikes which will further alienate the Pakistani people against our aims.