Re-Examining Afghanistan

The dismissal of Gen. Stanley McChrystal and his replacement by the celebrated Gen. David Petraeus has engendered not only discussion about whether his counterinsurgency efforts will be more effective, but whether our intervention in Afghanistan should be continued at all. There are many persuasive considerations that point to the conclusion that it should not. Let's take a look at the rationales behind our continued presence there.

The first is to fight terrorism, specifically the Al Qaeda organization that masterminded the 9/11 attacks back in 2001. Yet CIA Director Leon Panetta reports there are only an estimated 50-100 Al Qaeda operatives in the country. There are very few terrorists there. 100,000 troops to look for less than 100 enemies? For nine years? It is thought the Al Qaeda leadership is across the border in Pakistan, where they are by the same intelligence estimates thought to number less than 300. The whole cadre is estimated to be fewer than 500 in the entire Middle East. Trying to defeat them with a large army in one country is futile. They simply disperse and set up shop somewhere else. They are in Pakistan, but also Yemen, Somalia and various other places. They are much more a law enforcement than a military problem.

The second is to support the "legitimate" Afghan government. Yet by all accounts President Hamid Karzai stole the 2009 election that kept him in power. His brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is reputed to be one of the biggest opium dealers and influence peddlers in the country. Others in Karzai's ruling coalition circle are similarly unsavory, including the notorious Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. Are these the kinds of people to win the allegiance of the Afghan people or to send young Americans to die for?

A third justification given is to keep the Taliban out of power. Mindful of what he may need to do to stay in power once his foreign props are gone, Hamid Karzai has been making increasingly explicit overtures to coming to a modus vivendi with those selfsame Taliban. It appears likely they will enter the coalition soon anyway. Fighting to stave that off for a couple of more years hardly seems worth the cost. And speaking of cost, how long can the U.S. continue to spend $100 to $130 billion at a time of economic recession and deficit at home?

In short, the enemy is no longer there, the government is not worth fighting for and we cannot afford the expense. It is time to begin winding down this rather pointless and tragically costly exercise. The July, 2011 target date for beginning a withdrawal is none too soon.